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The Ins and Outs of Cyclical Unemployment 
 
By Michael W. L. Elsby, Ryan Michaels, and Gary Solon* 
 
Abstract 
A dominant trend in recent modeling of labor market fluctuations is to treat unemployment 
inflows as acyclical.  This trend has been encouraged by influential recent papers that stress the 
role of longer unemployment spells, rather than more unemployment spells, in accounting for 
recessionary unemployment.  After reviewing an empirical literature going back several decades, 
we apply a convenient log change decomposition to Current Population Survey data to 
characterize rising unemployment in each postwar recession.  We conclude that a complete 
understanding of cyclical unemployment requires an explanation of countercyclical inflow rates, 
especially for job losers (layoffs), as well as procyclical outflow rates. 
 
 
 
 In principle, the increased unemployment during a recession could arise from an increase 
in the number of unemployment spells, an increase in the duration of unemployment spells, or 
both.  Equivalently, one can decompose the cyclical variation in unemployment into changes in 
the rates of inflow to and outflow from unemployment.  The title of a 1986 paper by Michael R. 
Darby, John C. Haltiwanger, and Mark W. Plant (1986) dubbed this subject “The Ins and Outs of 
Unemployment.”  Because Darby et al. claimed that cyclical unemployment variation in the 
United States stems almost entirely from cyclical variation in the inflow, their paper’s subtitle 
was “The Ins Win.” 
 Contrary to that conclusion, one of the strongest trends in recent macroeconomic 
modeling of the labor market is to treat the inflow to unemployment as acyclical.  In some 
instances, acyclicality of the inflow is assumed; in others, the model is designed to explain the 
supposed acyclicality of the inflow.  Examples include Robert E. Hall (2005a, 2005b), Mark 
Gertler and Antonella Trigari (2006), Julio J. Rotemberg (2006), Olivier Blanchard and Jordi 
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Gali (2006), Christian Haefke and Michael Reiter (2006), and Leena Rudanko (2008).  Several 
of these authors motivate their treatment of the inflow as acyclical by referring to papers by 
Robert Shimer (2005a, 2005b) and Hall (2005b, 2006), which reach a conclusion diametrically 
opposite to that of Darby et al.  For example, the introductory passage in Shimer’s (2005a) paper 
“Reassessing the Ins and Outs of Unemployment” declares, “Using United States data from 1948 
to 2004, I find that there are substantial fluctuations in unemployed workers’ job finding 
probability at business cycle frequencies, while employed workers’ separation probability is 
comparatively acyclic.”1  Similarly, the abstract of Hall’s (2005b) Review of Economic Statistics 
Lecture says, “In the modern U.S. economy, recessions do not begin with a burst of layoffs.  
Unemployment rises because jobs are hard to find, not because an unusual number of people are 
thrown into unemployment.” 
 By 2006, several new manuscripts, including early drafts of the present paper,2 
reexamined the evidence on unemployment flows and disputed Shimer and Hall’s already-
influential conclusion that cyclical inflows are unimportant.  Accordingly, the abstract of the 
2007 revision of “Reassessing the Ins and Outs of Unemployment” acknowledges that, since 
1948, the inflow rate has accounted for one-quarter of the variation in the unemployment rate.  
The new abstract, however, goes on to declare, “Fluctuations in the employment exit probability 
are quantitatively irrelevant during the last two decades.”   
Viewed in the context of a longer history of unemployment studies, the opposite 
conclusions of Darby et al. and of Shimer and Hall both seem surprising.  Darby et al.’s finding 
                                                 
1 Shimer (2005a, 2005b) uses the term “separation probability” to mean the probability of entering unemployment.  
We do not use this terminology for two reasons.  First, we wish to avoid confusion with the more commonly used 
meaning of “separation” as a quit or layoff from a particular employer, which often involves no unemployment at all 
(especially in the case of quits).  Second, as we will emphasize in section I.D of this paper, many spells of 
unemployment begin with entry into the labor force, not a separation from employment. 
2 See also Helge Braun et al. (2006), Eran Yashiv (2008), and Shigeru Fujita and Garey Ramey (forthcoming). 
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that “The Ins Win” and the outs lose appears to be contradicted by a large body of accumulated 
evidence suggesting that unemployment duration is substantially countercyclical: 
• Regularly published statistics on the cross-sectional distribution of unemployment duration 
from the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) show a pronounced shift towards longer 
unemployment spells during recessions.  Similarly, sophisticated econometric analyses that 
have used repeated CPS cross-sectional data on unemployment duration to impute month-to-
month hazard rates for exiting unemployment have found these outflow rates to be 
substantially procyclical (Hal Sider, 1985; Michael Baker, 1992). 
• Numerous studies have estimated inflow and outflow rates with the so-called gross flows 
data, which are based on the two-thirds or so of the CPS sample that can be longitudinally 
matched from one month to the next.  Without exception, these studies have found that the 
monthly hazard rate for outflow from unemployment is procyclical (George L. Perry, 1972; 
Stephen T. Marston, 1976; Blanchard and Peter Diamond, 1990; Hoyt Bleakley, Ann E. 
Ferris, and Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, 1999; Yashiv, 2008; Fujita and Ramey, forthcoming).  
• Regularly published statistics on unemployment insurance (UI) claims show that, during 
recessions, UI claims tend to be of considerably longer duration, and the fraction of claimants 
that exhaust their entitlement to benefits is considerably higher (Walter Nicholson, 1981; 
John Kennan, 2006).  These facts, of course, are precisely why the federal government 
usually adopts extended-benefit programs during recessions. 
 
Shimer and Hall’s opposite conclusion that the outs win and the ins lose also appears to 
be contradicted by a great deal of evidence: 
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• The regularly published CPS statistics on unemployment duration show that the number 
unemployed less than five weeks (who therefore became unemployed since the previous 
month’s CPS) tends to be substantially higher during recessions. 
• The same studies of CPS gross flows data that have found procyclical hazard rates for exiting 
unemployment also have found substantially countercyclical flows into unemployment.  
Most recently, for example, Fujita and Ramey (forthcoming) estimate that countercyclical 
inflows account for 40 to 50 percent of cyclical variation in unemployment.3 
• Several studies (Darby et al., 1986; Steven J. Davis, 1987; Blanchard and Diamond, 1990; 
Joseph A. Ritter, 1993) have noted that, although the hazard rate for exiting unemployment is 
procyclical, the number exiting unemployment is countercyclical.  As explained by 
Blanchard and Diamond (1990, p. 118), “While the flow from unemployment to employment 
increases in a recession, the hazard rate decreases as the pool of unemployed increases 
proportionately more than the flow.”  Davis (2006) shows that this can occur only if the 
inflow to unemployment is substantially countercyclical. 
• Regularly published statistics on initial UI claims show that dramatically more UI claims are 
initiated during recessions, especially early in recessions (Kennan, 2006).  This, of course, is 
why the Conference Board uses initial UI claims as one of its “leading indicators.” 
• All these indications of countercyclical inflows into unemployment dovetail with well-
established facts about labor turnover, including the recent employer-based evidence on 
                                                 
3 Although Shimer (2007) emphasizes the evidence from repeated cross-sections of the CPS, section 2 of his paper 
also analyzes the gross flows data.  The results in his table 2 suggest that countercyclical inflows account for about 
one-third of cyclical unemployment variation over the 1967-2007 period and about 20 percent over 1987-2007.  
These findings, however, are not reflected in Shimer’s abstract, introduction, or conclusion. 
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countercyclical job destruction as well as a long history of evidence that layoffs are strongly 
countercyclical (Peter S. Barth, 1971; Davis, R. Jason Faberman, and Haltiwanger, 2006).4  
 
Reacting to the apparent discrepancy between these patterns and Shimer and Hall’s 
influential conclusion, in this paper we reexamine the evidence from repeated cross-sections of 
the CPS.  Yashiv (2008) and Fujita and Ramey (forthcoming) have recently reexamined the 
evidence from the CPS gross flows data, but published time series data from CPS cross-sections 
are the basis for the evidence that Shimer (2005a, 2005b, 2007) emphasizes and describes as his 
“preferred measures” (2007, p. 1).  One advantage of using that publicly available information, 
as Shimer (2007, pp. 2-3) says, is “making it easy for others to verify my results, extend them as 
more data becomes available, and examine their consistency both within the United States and 
across countries.”  In addition, the gross flows data are subject to a number of drawbacks, 
including the systematic exclusion of individuals who change residence and the many spurious 
transitions generated by misclassification of labor force status in either of the months used in the 
longitudinal match (National Commission on Employment and Unemployment Statistics, 1979, 
pp. 214-17; Anthony J. Barkume and Francis W. Horvath, 1995).  We therefore consider it 
worthwhile to examine both types of evidence.  As it turns out, our findings and those of gross 
flows studies like Yashiv (2008) and Fujita and Ramey (forthcoming) are qualitatively similar.  
It is useful and reassuring to find that both slices of the CPS data yield similar answers. 
                                                 
4 As noted by Hall (2006), the countercyclicality of layoffs is no greater than the procyclicality of quits.  This point 
was previously documented by Sumner H. Slichter (1919), W. S. Woytinsky (1942), George A. Akerlof, Andrew K. 
Rose, and Janet L. Yellen (1988), Patricia M. Anderson and Bruce D. Meyer (1994), and others.  Despite the well-
known ambiguities in the measurement and interpretation of layoffs versus quits, the two types of separations 
display large systematic differences in their cyclicality and in the associated incidence of unemployment and 
changes in earnings.  Davis (2006) gives a detailed explanation of why distinguishing layoffs from quits is important 
for understanding cyclical fluctuations in the labor market.  
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Section I of our paper takes Shimer’s analysis of the published CPS series as our point of 
departure.  In section I.A, we describe a remarkably simple but useful way of decomposing 
unemployment variation into parts associated with logarithmic changes in the hazard rates for 
flowing into and out of unemployment.5  In section I.B, we apply that decomposition to the CPS 
time series data.  Like many previous researchers, we find that much or most of cyclical 
unemployment variation can be attributed to cyclicality in the outflow hazard, but we also find 
an important role for inflows, especially in the most severe recessions.  In section I.C, we 
propose and implement modifications of Shimer’s methods of correcting for the 1994 CPS 
redesign and time aggregation bias.  These refinements reconfirm our finding of substantial 
cyclicality in both inflow and outflow rates. 
In section I.D, we consider heterogeneity in flow rates across job losers, job leavers, and 
labor force entrants.  This exercise reveals stark differences in the cyclical properties of the three 
inflow hazards.  The job loser inflow to unemployment is clearly countercyclical, displaying 
prominent upward spikes in all recessions.  By contrast, the job leaver inflow rate is prominently 
procyclical and the inflow from non-participation is comparatively acyclical. 
In light of these findings, in section II we caution against the recent tendency of 
macroeconomic theorists to overlook the cyclicality of unemployment inflows.  A complete 
understanding of cyclical unemployment requires an explanation of countercyclical 
                                                 
5 The basic idea dates back to Hyman Kaitz’s (1970) seminal work on unemployment duration.  He notes that “small 
percentage changes in the unemployment rate from one period to another are approximately equal to the sum of the 
percent changes in the number of new spells and in the length of the average spell” (p. 14).  To our knowledge, the 
2006 draft of our paper was the first attempt to use the log change decomposition for systematic analysis of the 
contributions of the flow hazard rates to cyclical unemployment.  This decomposition has subsequently been 
adopted by Fujita and Ramey (forthcoming), who use our equation (3) formulation, and Christopher A. Pissarides 
(2007), who uses our equation (4) version.  Pissarides appears to have been aware of the result at an earlier date.  
Page 505 of his 1986 Economic Policy paper on unemployment and vacancies in Britain says, “The two series for 
the flow rates are plotted in Figure 1 on a logarithmic scale: what matters for changes in the unemployment rate are 
proportional changes in the flow rates.”  More recently, Dale T. Mortensen and Eva Nagypal (2005) use the result to 
explore the theoretical implications of exogenous shocks to job destruction in the context of the search model. 
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unemployment inflow rates (especially for job losers) as well as procyclical outflow rates.  We 
also pose the question of what can be learned about the economics of the business cycle from 
performing purely mechanical decompositions of cyclical unemployment variation into inflow 
and outflow components.  We explain why some of the cyclical variation in the outflow hazard 
may be caused by cyclical changes in the size and composition of the inflow, and we suggest 
more generally that the choice and interpretation of decomposition methods ultimately must 
depend on the economic models being considered. 
 
I.  An Analysis of Published Time Series from the Current Population Survey 
A. Some Useful Identities 
Shimer (2007) and Hall (2005b) start with the following description of the evolution over 
time of the number unemployed:  
(1) ( ) ( )( )*t t t t t t t t tdu s l u f u s f u udt = − − = − + −  
where lt and ut are the labor force and unemployment stocks respectively, ut* is steady state 
unemployment, and st and ft are the unemployment inflow and outflow hazard rates.  It should be 
mentioned at the outset that equation (1) accurately describes the evolution of unemployment 
only if all inflows into unemployment originate from employment.  In fact, however, around 40 
percent of the stock of unemployed workers report that their unemployment originated from non-
participation in the labor force.  We will address this issue in detail in section I.D, but for now 
we maintain Shimer and Hall’s simplifying assumption. 
The focus of interest, then, is on the two flow rates st and ft.  As many previous studies 
have shown, and as we will confirm, since (st + ft) is typically close to 0.5 on a monthly basis, the 
half life of a deviation from steady state unemployment is close to one month.  In other words, 
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the evolution of the actual unemployment rate, which we denote , is closely approximated by 
the steady state unemployment rate: 
u
(2) 
*
t t t
t
t t t
u u su
l l s f
≡ ≈ =
t+
 
 In what follows, a recurring theme will be the decomposition of changes in the observed 
unemployment rate into a contribution due to changes in the inflow rate and a contribution due to 
changes in the outflow rate.  It turns out that equation (2) provides us with a remarkably simple 
decomposition.  In particular, log differentiation of (2) yields 
(3)  ( )[ ]log 1 log logt t t td u u d s d f≈ − −  
Equivalently, multiplying (3) through by  yields tu
(4)  ( )[ ]1 log logt tt tdu u u d s d f≈ − − t
                                                
 
Expressed in either way, the equation provides a decomposition in which the 
contributions of the inflow and outflow rates are separable and may be compared on an equal 
footing with respect to their impact on the unemployment rate. To obtain a transparent view of 
the relative contributions of the inflow and outflow rates, all one need do is compare the log 
variation in the two rates.6 
 
B. Evidence from CPS Time Series Data 
As noted by Shimer, a significant virtue of his methodology is the ease of its replication.  
In this spirit, we use the same, publicly available, seasonally adjusted CPS data on the number 
 
6 Of course, equations (3) and (4) hold as equalities only for infinitesimal changes.  For discrete changes, they are 
only approximations.  Fujita and Ramey’s (forthcoming) regression-based estimation of our log change 
decomposition verifies that it works well for discrete changes, in the sense that the estimated components come 
remarkably close to summing to 1. 
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employed, the number unemployed, and the number unemployed less than five weeks 
(henceforth “short-term unemployment”) for each month from 1948 through 2004.7   
Shimer’s analysis involves two corrections to these time series.  First, as discussed by 
Anne E. Polivka and Stephen M. Miller (1998) and Katherine G. Abraham and Shimer (2001), 
the 1994 redesign of the CPS changed the way the survey measures unemployment duration for 
all of the survey’s eight “rotation groups” except the first and fifth.8  The resulting reduction in 
the number counted as short-term unemployed induced a discontinuity in the series.  Shimer’s 
main method of correcting for the discontinuity is, in each month from 1994 on,  to inflate the 
official count of short-term unemployment by that month’s ratio of the short-term share of 
unemployment in the first and fifth rotation groups (obtained from the CPS microdata) to the 
short-term share for the full sample.  Equivalently, he multiplies the official count of all 
unemployment by the short-term share in only the first and fifth rotation groups.  This treats the 
discontinuity because, even since 1994, the first and fifth rotation groups’ unemployment 
duration has been measured in the same way as the full sample’s was before 1994.  In this 
section’s replication, we use Shimer’s correction method, but in section I.C we will implement a 
variation of the method that we believe is even better. 
Second, instead of just using the monthly time series to calculate monthly transition rates, 
Shimer devises an ingenious way of inferring continuous-time inflow and outflow hazard rates, st 
and ft.  Inferring the outflow hazard rate is relatively straightforward.  First calculate the 
                                                 
7 These data are readily obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website, www.bls.gov.  
8 In the CPS sample design, an address selected into the sample remains in the sample for four consecutive months, 
is temporarily rotated out of the sample for eight months, and then is rotated back in for four more months before 
being permanently retired from the sample.  The first and fifth rotation groups are respectively the addresses in the 
survey for the first time and those reentering after the eight-month hiatus.  The crucial change in the 1994 redesign 
was that, in all rotation groups except the first and fifth, unemployed individuals who also were unemployed as of 
the previous month’s interview were no longer asked about their unemployment duration.  Instead, their 
unemployment duration was measured as the previous month’s value incremented by the number of weeks between 
the two monthly interviews.   
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probability that a typical unemployed worker leaves unemployment in the month between 
consecutive CPS surveys, Ft, using the identity 
(5)  1 1
s
t t tu u F+ +Δ = − tu
where Δut+1 is the monthly change in the number unemployed between month t and month t + 1, 
and 1
s
tu +  is the number unemployed less than five weeks in month t + 1.  Thus, the monthly 
outflow probability is given by ( )1 11 st t tF u u+ + / tu⎡ ⎤= − −⎣ ⎦
( )t t
.  This can then be mapped into the 
outflow hazard, log 1f F= − − . 
 Inferring the inflow hazard is more difficult.  The reason is that some workers who flow 
into the unemployment pool after one month’s CPS also exit unemployment before the next 
month’s survey. As a result, the measured stock of short-term unemployed workers in any CPS is 
in fact an underestimate of the number of workers who flowed into the unemployment pool over 
the course of the preceding month.  The latter is what Shimer refers to as time aggregation bias.9 
 To correct for time aggregation bias, Shimer solves (1), the differential equation for the 
evolution of the unemployment rate, forward one month under the assumptions that the flows, st 
and ft, and the labor force, lt, are constant between surveys: 
(6) ( ) ( )* *1 expt t t t t tu u u u s f+ ⎡ ⎤= + − − +⎣ ⎦  
Since we obtain a measure of the outflow rate ft from the method above, and since we observe ut 
and ut+1, the unemployment rates at the beginning and end of the month, we can solve (6) for the 
inflow hazard st. 
                                                 
9 Note that there is no analogous time aggregation problem in the measurement of unemployment outflows due to 
unemployed workers leaving unemployment and re-entering between CPS surveys.  The reason is that the CPS in 
theory picks up all such workers, as they will be measured as unemployed less than five weeks. 
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 Following this method provides us with measures of the inflow and outflow rates for each 
month from 1948 through 2004.  As a final step, to obtain what Shimer refers to as his preferred 
measures of unemployment inflow and outflow rates, we take quarterly averages of these 
monthly series to obtain smoother series.   
In our figure 1 we replicate Shimer’s figure 1 and display the quarterly time series of the 
probabilities of flowing in or out of unemployment over the course of a month.  To the untrained 
eye, figure 1 might give the impression that the cyclical variation in the inflow to unemployment 
is dwarfed by the variation in the outflow from unemployment.  However, a key lesson from 
equations (3) and (4) in our section I.A is that a more apt comparison is between the variation in 
the logarithms of the inflow and outflow hazard rates.  Figure 2 displays these log flows.  Note 
that, since the range of the vertical axes measuring these two log flows is the same, equal-sized 
variation in either plot will have an equal-sized impact on the unemployment rate. 
Inspection of figure 2 reveals substantial variation in log inflow rates in all recessions 
except the two most recent (the relatively mild 1990 and 2001 recessions).  Thus it is by no 
means clear that the inflow rate into unemployment is, in Shimer’s words, “comparatively 
acyclic” relative to the outflow rate, except in these recent recessions. 
A natural question at this point is what fraction of the increase in unemployment during a 
recession is due to increases in the inflow rate into unemployment, and what fraction is due to 
declines in the outflow rate?  Thanks to the decomposition presented in section I.A, such a 
question is straightforward to answer.  We first identified start and end dates for the 
unemployment ramp-up in each recession from 1948 on.10  We then calculated the difference in 
                                                 
10 In practice, the start dates were determined by the most recent minimum quarterly unemployment rate preceding 
each NBER recession start date, and the end dates by the highest quarterly unemployment rate following each 
NBER recession end date.  The NBER recession dates were not used as their focus is not on recessionary 
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the log inflow rate and log outflow rate relative to their start-of-recession values for each 
recession in turn.  Figure 3 plots the change in the log inflow rate and the negative of the change 
in the log outflow rate for each quarter of each recession since 1948.  As indicated in equation 
(3), these two quantities multiplied by 1 minus the unemployment rate give an approximate 
accounting for the change in the log of the unemployment rate. 
 Figure 3 reveals a number of insights.  First, consistent with the results of Shimer and 
many others, we observe that the outflow rate from unemployment fell in most recessions by 
about 30 to 50 log points.  Thus, variation in the outflow rate from unemployment is a crucial 
aspect of cyclical unemployment.  And it is true that the outflow rate explains the majority of the 
cumulative peak-to-trough rise in unemployment over the cycle, with a greater relative impact 
later on in a recession.   
However, figure 3 confirms that inflow rates also have played a substantial role in 
generating cyclical unemployment historically.  In particular, we observe that the inflow into 
unemployment typically rose by around 20 to 40 log points from peak to trough, except in the 
last two recessions.11  We also observe that the effects of inflows tend to be strongest at the start 
of recessions, in contrast to the effects of the outflow rate.  Thus, graphed in an appropriate 
metric, the data show that, until the two recent recessions, there was something like a 35:65 
inflow/outflow split of the overall increase in unemployment, with relatively more weight on 
inflows earlier on and outflows later on in a recession.  Thus, Shimer’s (2005b, p. 493) 
influential published claim that the inflow rate is “nearly acyclical” is an overstatement at best. 
                                                                                                                                                             
unemployment, but rather principally on GDP growth, and they thereby miss a large portion of the cyclical ramp-up 
in unemployment.  Figure 0 displays these dates along with the time series for the unemployment rate. 
11 For both outflows and inflows, the changes in log points appear small in the major recession period of the early 
1980s because we break the period into two separate recessions. 
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 Figure 3 also highlights the difference in unemployment patterns between the last two 
recessions and the many prior recessions.  In the last two recessions, especially the one of the 
early 1990s, aggregate inflows into unemployment moved comparatively little.  These weak 
aggregate inflow effects appear to be a feature of these last two recessions rather than a stylized 
fact of recessionary unemployment as a whole.  In any case, in the next two sections, we shall 
see reasons to question figure 3’s depiction of the most recent recessions.  In section I.C, we 
shall see that the apparent weakness of inflow effects in the 2000/01 recession varies with the 
method of correcting for the CPS redesign.  And our disaggregate analysis in section I.D will 
reveal that the aggregate picture presented in figure 3 masks some important heterogeneity in the 
effects of different inflow rates for different sub-groups of the unemployed.  In the end, the 
inflow effects in the last recession will not look so different from those in prior recessions. 
 
C. Alternative Corrections for the CPS Redesign and Time Aggregation Bias 
To this point, we have followed Shimer’s methods of correcting the published CPS data 
for the effects of the CPS redesign and time aggregation.  We agree that corrections are called, 
but we think the methods can be improved on.  In this section, we propose refinements of the 
correction methods and present the results from applying them.   
As mentioned above, to treat the discontinuity in the short-term unemployment series 
induced by the 1994 CPS redesign, Shimer multiplies the official unemployment count in each 
month from 1994 on by the month’s short-term share of unemployment for only the first and 
fifth rotation groups, whose unemployment duration measurement was unaffected by the 
redesign.  As Shimer acknowledges in his appendix, a drawback of this approach is that it bases 
each month’s estimated short-term share on only about one-quarter of the unemployed in the 
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CPS sample and therefore multiplies the sampling variance of the estimate by about four.  The 
resulting noise in the corrected series can make it more difficult to discern the true cyclical 
variation in unemployment flows since 1994.  This noise from sampling error would get worse 
still in our section I.D, when we disaggregate the unemployed into job losers, job leavers, and 
labor force entrants. 
An alternative approach that can yield a more stable corrected series for short-term 
unemployment over the post-redesign era is to multiply the official short-term unemployment 
series by the era’s average of the ratio of the short-term share for the first and fifth rotation 
groups to the full sample’s short-term share.  Our analysis of CPS microdata from February 1994 
(the first month that unemployment duration was measured in the new way for all rotation 
groups except the first and fifth) through January 2005 finds an average ratio of 1.1549.  We 
therefore produce a less noisy post-redesign series by simply multiplying the official short-term 
unemployment by 1.1549 in each month from February 1994 on.12 
To get a sense of the practical difference between Shimer’s and our methods of correcting 
for the CPS redesign, figure 4 plots the month-by-month scaling factor used by Shimer, together 
with our scaling factor.  It can be seen that the month-by-month correction factor displays 
considerable volatility and little obvious systematic trend around our correction factor of 1.1549. 
Figure 5 displays the effects of our alternative redesign correction on the decomposition 
of cyclical unemployment in the last recession, along with the previous five recessions by way of 
comparison.  It can be seen that our less noisy correction for the 1994 redesign reveals a 
substantially more pronounced effect of the inflow rate in the 2001 recession.  In particular, the 
                                                 
12 In footnote 27 of his appendix, Shimer (2007) mentions an analysis in which he multiplied the post-redesign 
short-term unemployment by a constant factor of 1.10, but he does not explain his choice of 1.10.  Statistics he 
reports in his appendix seem to indicate that 44.2/37.9=1.166 would be a more appropriate choice.  Based on 
different information from the CPS “parallel survey,” Polivka and Miller (1998) suggest an even higher correction 
factor of 1/.830 = 1.205. 
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inflow contribution in the last recession no longer looks so different from the inflow 
contributions in some of the earlier recessions.   
The second correction to the CPS data seeks to avoid the time aggregation bias that 
would result from missing unemployment spells that begin after one month’s CPS and end 
before the next month’s survey.  As explained in our section I.B, Shimer’s approach is to impute 
continuous-time hazard rates for the unemployment inflow.  An alternative approach, pioneered 
by Kaitz (1970) and Perry (1972), is to impute discrete weekly hazard rates.  One advantage of 
the latter approach is that, unlike the continuous-time method, it is consistent with the discrete 
weekly nature of the CPS labor force definitions.  Each month’s CPS interviews take place 
during the week containing the 19th of the month, and the labor force questions pertain to the 
“reference week” containing the 12th.  Someone who works at any time during the reference 
week is counted as employed.  Thus, contrary to the assumptions of the continuous-time 
correction method, a worker who loses her job partway through the reference week would not be 
counted as unemployed in the CPS data. 
More fundamentally, it is not clear whether the process governing transitions into and out 
of unemployment should be viewed even theoretically as a purely continuous-time process.  If a 
particular worker surveyed in the CPS were to quit one job effective 5:00 pm. on Wednesday of 
the reference week and start a new job at 9:00 a.m. the next day, a continuous-time approach 
would regard that worker as unemployed every instant between those two times.  Not only would 
the official CPS classification scheme judge otherwise; we suspect that most readers would as 
well.  This is not to say that the official definition or, for that matter, any other specific 
classification scheme is clearly correct.  What if the worker who quit at 5:00 on Wednesday 
chose not to start her new job till Friday or Monday?  Would she be unemployed while between 
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the two jobs?  The official definition (and, we suspect, at least some readers) would say no.  
Other readers might say yes.13 
Our reaction to the inescapable ambiguity is to check what happens to the results based 
on the continuous-time correction if instead we use discrete weekly hazard rates.  The details of 
our approach are in our appendix.  Similarly to Shimer’s correction, ours boils down to the 
solution to a non-linear equation in the weekly inflow probability stw, and the weekly outflow 
probability, ftw: 
(7) ( )( )4* *1 1w w wt t t t t tu u u u s f+ = + − − − w
                                                
 
where  is the steady-state weekly unemployment stock. *wtu
Figure 6 illustrates both the discrete-time and continuous-time corrected log inflow 
hazard rates, along with the uncorrected inflow rate for comparison.14  As expected, both 
aggregation bias corrections raise the level of estimated inflow rates, since they seek to add back 
on inflows that subsequently exited unemployment between survey dates.  In particular, the 
continuous-time correction increases the level of the measured inflow rate by about 30 log 
points, while the discrete-time correction does so by around 23 log points.  Thus, the continuous-
time correction arguably over-corrects for time aggregation bias in the sense that it imputes short 
unemployment spells that the official statistics would not recognize as unemployment spells even 
if the CPS took place every single week.   
 
13 The latter readers might prefer a hybrid correction method that views the flow process as a purely continuous-time 
process, but recognizes that the CPS statistics are based on definitions using a weekly interval.  Developing and 
implementing such a correction would be a worthy project for future research, but we have not pursued it here 
because it turns out that our discrete-time correction does not dramatically alter the conclusions about the 
contributions of inflow and outflow rates. 
14 To isolate the effects of the alternative corrections for time aggregation bias, all the series plotted in figure 6 use 
our correction for the 1994 redesign.  
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In addition, figure 6 reveals that, since the aggregation bias corrections raise the level of 
estimated inflow rates, they reduce the log change in the inflow rate over the cycle.15  Simple 
least squares regressions of corrected log inflow rates on the uncorrected log inflow rate reveal 
coefficients of 0.78 for the continuous-time correction and 0.85 for the discrete-time correction, 
consistent with the notion that correcting for aggregation bias limits the capacity for inflows to 
explain cyclical unemployment.  The latter also reveals that, because the weekly correction 
affects the inflow level to a lesser extent than the continuous-time correction, it also preserves 
more of the log variation in inflow rates over time, and thereby in theory affords greater potential 
for inflows to explain cyclical unemployment. 
 Figure 7 compares the inflow contributions implied by the two alternative corrections for 
aggregation bias, as well as the contributions based on no correction at all.16   The starkest 
finding is that failing to correct for time aggregation bias does indeed apportion a greater role to 
the inflow rate, and therefore correcting for that bias is important.  It is also true that the weekly 
correction places marginally greater emphasis on inflows than the continuous-time correction, 
but quantitatively the effects are small.  Thus, the results based on the discrete-time aggregation 
correction methods are broadly similar to those obtained in the aggregate analysis of section I.B. 
 
D. Disaggregation by Reason for Unemployment 
Until now, we have been concentrating on aggregate unemployment flows based on 
Shimer’s approach to the published CPS time series.  As noted at the beginning of section I.A, 
                                                 
15 Strictly speaking, this occurs for a slightly different reason from that highlighted by Shimer, who argues that 
“ignoring time aggregation will bias a researcher towards finding a countercyclical separation probability, because 
when the job finding probability falls, a worker who loses her job is more likely to experience a measured spell of 
unemployment.”  In fact, we find that the aggregation bias corrections have little effect on the countercyclicality of 
the level of the inflow rate. But, by raising the overall level of the inflow rate, they reduce the countercyclicality of 
the log inflow rate, which is what matters for the statistical decomposition of cyclical variation in unemployment. 
16 For all three of these approaches to time aggregation bias, this figure’s contributions for the most recent recession 
are based on our correction for the 1994 CPS redesign. 
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however, this approach ignores that almost half of unemployment comes from non-participation 
in the labor force, not employment.  In this section, we extend the analysis to incorporate flows 
from non-participation.  At the same time, we also distinguish employment-to-unemployment 
flows stemming from job loss and from job leaving, as these two flows have very different 
cyclical properties.   
The disaggregated analysis in this section uses data on the number unemployed by 
reason, the number unemployed for less than five weeks by reason, and aggregate series for 
employment and non-participation.  Our disaggregation of unemployment by reason uses three 
categories: job losers, job leavers, and labor force entrants.17  The complete requisite series for 
short-term unemployment by reason are not available on the BLS website, so we have based this 
section’s analysis on data from the monthly BLS Employment and Earnings publications.  Even 
those data for short-term unemployment by reason extend back only to May 1968 and are not 
seasonally adjusted.  For internal consistency, we start with the seasonally unadjusted 
Employment and Earnings data for all the series used in this section.  As in section I.C, we treat 
the 1994 discontinuity in the short-term unemployment series by multiplying each published 
short-term unemployment number from February 1994 on by an average ratio of the short-term 
share of unemployment in the first and fifth rotation groups to the corresponding short-term 
share for the full sample.  In particular, based on the CPS microdata from February 1994 through 
January 2005, we calculate correction factors of 1.0948 for job losers, 1.1644 for job leavers, and 
1.2221 for labor force entrants.  Finally, we seasonally adjust all the series with Eviews’ 
implementation of the Census Bureau’s X-12 procedure. 
                                                 
17 We do not further disaggregate job losers into temporary layoffs and permanent job losers for two reasons.  First, 
the temporary layoff information is available only back to 1976.  Second, as explained in Polivka and Miller (1998), 
the 1994 CPS redesign caused a discontinuity in the way the two types of job losers are distinguished.  Similarly, we 
do not disaggregate labor force entrants into new entrants and re-entrants because the 1994 redesign instituted a 
major change in the way the two types of entrants are distinguished. 
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Given the resulting data, it is again straightforward to calculate monthly outflow 
probabilities for each reason for unemployment.  Specifically, for each reason we can calculate 
, where a subscript r denotes reason.  And, as in the aggregate case, 
we can calculate the associated outflow hazards by reason, 
( ), 1 , 11 srt r t r t rtF u u+ +⎡= − −⎣ / u ⎤⎦
( )log 1rt rtf F= − − .  As detailed in 
our appendix, we treat time aggregation bias with an extension of our discrete-time correction, 
which produces a corrected inflow hazard srt for each type of unemployment. 
Figure 8 displays the time series for each of these inflow rates.  It reveals stark 
heterogeneity in the cyclical properties of the three inflow hazards.  The job loser inflow is 
clearly countercyclical, displaying prominent upward spikes in all recessions.  By contrast, the 
job leaver inflow rate is prominently procyclical (which is not so surprising given the 
procyclicality of quit rates noted above in footnote 4).  Finally, the inflow from non-participation 
is comparatively acyclical. 
The latter three observations have an important implication with respect to the literature’s 
usual approach of considering only the aggregated inflow.  Concentrating on the aggregate 
inflow rate conflates loser and leaver inflows that move in opposite directions over the cycle, and 
in addition it averages them with a broadly acyclical inflow of entrants.  Looking only at an 
aggregate inflow has the effect of masking the individual contributions of each of these inflow 
rates that move in different cyclical directions. 
 Figure 9 displays the analogous results for outflow rates by type.  This figure exhibits 
two types of heterogeneity.  First, job losers show considerably lower outflow rates (and hence 
longer unemployment spells) than do leavers and entrants.  This fact combined with the 
countercyclicality of losers’ share of the inflow constitutes the kernel of truth in the argument by 
Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant (1986): One reason the aggregate outflow rate declines in a 
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recession is the increased inflow share of job losers, whose outflow rates are relatively low.  As 
shown by Baker (1992) (and reaffirmed in section 3 of Shimer, 2007), however, this composition 
effect is not nearly strong enough to justify Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant’s conclusion that “The 
Ins Win.”18  Interpreted in the framework of our equation (3), the estimates in Baker’s tables 1 
and 3 indicate that adjusting for this composition effect decreases the share of cyclical 
unemployment due to cyclicality in outflow rates from 57 percent to 49 percent.  Thus, Baker’s 
results are altogether consistent with our conclusion that both the ins and outs of unemployment 
are empirically important. 
Second, figure 9 shows that the outflow rate is especially procyclical for job losers.  
Because the outflow rate also is quite procyclical for the other two types of unemployed, though, 
aggregating the various outflow rates is much less problematic than aggregation of the inflows. 
To get a sense of the individual contributions of each of the inflow and outflow rates by 
reason, we again seek to decompose the change in the log unemployment rate into components 
due to each of the flows.  To this end, note first that we can split the aggregate unemployment 
rate into the sum of the unemployment rates for each reason,    qu u u uλ e= + + , where subscripts 
λ, q, and e refer to job losers, job leavers (quits), and labor force entrants respectively.  Log 
differentiation of the latter reveals that the change in the log unemployment rate is equal to the 
share-weighted sum of the log changes in the constituent sub unemployment rates: 
(8)    log log log logq eq ed u d u d u d uλλω ω ω= + +  
where ωr is the unemployment share of reason r.  In steady state, the three sub unemployment 
rates are given by 
                                                 
18 Baker and Shimer also explore composition changes with respect to observable demographic characteristics and 
conclude that these can explain very little of the cyclicality in outflow rates.  Of course, this does not rule out the 
possibility of important composition changes with respect to unobserved characteristics. 
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(9) 
 
 
 
/ log log log log
/ log log log log
/ log log log log
q qq q q q
e ee e e e
u s e f d u d s d f d
u s e f d u d s d f d
u s i f d u d s d f d i
λ λλ λ λ λ= ⇒ = − +
= ⇒ = − +
= ⇒ = − +
e
e
i
 
where e and i denote employment and non-participation as a fraction of the labor force.  It turns 
out that the log variation in both e and i over time is minuscule relative to the cyclical variation 
in log unemployment (see figure 10).  Thus, a very good approximation over the few quarters 
represented by a recessionary ramp-up in unemployment is that log 0 logd e d≈ ≈ .19  This 
yields the following very simple approximate decomposition: 
(10)       [ ] [ ]log log log log log log logq q q e ed u d s d f d s d f d s d fλ λ λω ω ω⎡ ⎤≈ − + − + −⎣ ⎦ e
                                                
 
Figure 11 displays the results of this decomposition.  Specifically, it plots the 
contribution of each unemployment flow, for each reason, for each recession since 1969.  The 
contribution of each flow is measured, in accordance with equation (10), by multiplying the 
difference in the log flow relative to its start of recession value by the initial share in 
unemployment of that flow at the start of the recession. 
 The results of this exercise reveal that there is a great deal of richer detail underlying the 
aggregate analyses performed by Shimer, ourselves, and others.  First and foremost, the 
decomposition indicates that the most important flow in all but the last two recessions was the 
job loser inflow rate.  In addition, the job loser inflow contributed to a non-trivial degree in the 
1990 recession, and was very prominent in the first five quarters of the 2001 unemployment 
 
19 Of course, although the cyclical variation in  and  is far smaller than the cyclical variation in , it 
is not really zero.  That is why we do not use this approximation in the previous analyses of sections I.A, B, and C, 
where we do not need the approximation to derive a tractable decomposition method. 
elog ilog ulog
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ramp-up.20  Thus, recent claims such as “In the modern U.S. economy, recessions do not begin 
with a burst of layoffs” (Hall, 2005b, p. 397) are not supported by the CPS data.21 
 Moreover, figure 11 confirms that the aggregate picture presented in figure 3 masks 
important heterogeneity in the cyclical effects of each individual inflow rate. Specifically, it can 
be seen that the contribution to recession unemployment due to job leavers is systematically 
negative because the leaver inflow rate is procyclical.  This serves to offset part of the increase in 
unemployment due to increased job loss.   
Figure 11 also provides some insight into why the aggregate inflow rate performs 
relatively poorly in explaining the increase in unemployment in recent recessions.  The 
contribution of the inflow rate from non-participation declined from a positive effect in the 1969, 
1973, and 1979 recessions, to mildly positive in the 1981 and 1990 recessions, to negative in the 
2001 recession.  This is important to emphasize as, from a theoretical perspective, 
macroeconomists are typically most interested in unemployment inflows that originate from 
employment rather than non-participation.  Indeed, Shimer’s (2005a, 2005b) practice of referring 
to the unemployment inflow rate as the “separation rate” reflects this focus. 
 Turning to outflows, we can see from figure 11 that the reason aggregate outflows 
explain so much of the variation in unemployment is because all of the constituent outflows by 
reason cause unemployment to move in the same direction – that is, up in a recession.  In 
addition, we see that the most important outflow is the outflow rate for job losers.  This is to be 
expected, as job losers represent a substantial fraction of the unemployment pool.  That aside, 
                                                 
20 Note that our choice to weight by pre-recession unemployment shares errs on the side of understating the 
importance of the job loser inflow.   
21 Hall’s conclusion is based partly on the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS).  Because JOLTS 
began in December 2000, it missed part of the ramp-up to the most recent recession.  Furthermore, the JOLTS data 
for that recession seem to be at odds with information from other surveys, including our evidence from the CPS.  A 
careful comparison of what multiple sources of labor market data have to say about the last recession would be a 
very worthwhile research project. 
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however, the losers outflow rate is conspicuously dominant in the 1990 recession, again 
suggesting that this recession was especially different from the others in the sample period. 
 A question that arises at this point is the extent to which the disaggregated analysis is 
important.  Surely, one might argue, it nevertheless aggregates to the same story mentioned in 
section I.B?  Our view, however, is that the disaggregated analysis culminating in figure 11 
affords a more nuanced and illuminating view of unemployment flows, especially with regard to 
the inflows.  It is not clear what economic hypothesis is being assessed when one observes the 
cyclicality of the aggregate inflow rate, which is a weighted average of a number of sub-inflow 
rates.   However, the economics becomes clearer, and very intuitive, when one looks at inflows 
by reason.  The job leaver inflow into unemployment falls in all recessions for the same reason 
that the quit rate does – presumably because workers find it harder then to find attractive new 
jobs.  The job loser inflow rate rises in all recessions for the same reason that the layoff rate does 
– because firms want to employ fewer workers in a recession; they are unable (especially in the 
more severe recessions) to achieve the intended employment reductions merely by allowing 
workers to quit; and they therefore lay off more workers, many of whom then experience 
unemployment. 
 
II.  Summary and Discussion 
Our reanalysis of repeated cross-section data from the Current Population Survey has 
confirmed the finding of previous studies that procyclicality of the hazard rate for exiting 
unemployment plays an important role in cyclical unemployment.  Contrary to Shimer and Hall’s 
conclusions, however, we have shown that even Shimer’s own methods and data indicate an 
important role for countercyclical inflows into unemployment.  This finding is further 
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strengthened by our refinements of Shimer’s methods of correcting the official CPS labor force 
series for the 1994 redesign of the CPS and for time aggregation bias.  In addition, we have 
conducted a disaggregated analysis that recognizes the large unemployment inflows from non-
participation in the labor force and also distinguishes employment-to-unemployment inflows 
stemming from job losing and job leaving.  The disaggregated results highlight the particularly 
important role of job loss inflows to unemployment in accounting for increased unemployment 
in most recessions.  Thus, in contrast to both Darby et al.’s pronouncement that “The Ins Win” 
and Shimer and Hall’s opposite conclusion that the outs win, we find that everyone’s a winner. 
At a basic level, then, our paper suggests that a complete understanding of cyclical 
unemployment requires an explanation of countercyclical unemployment inflow rates as well as 
procyclical outflow rates.  Accordingly, the many recent analyses cited in our second paragraph 
that overlook cyclical inflows may be ill-advised.  By the same token, earlier efforts to explain 
why unemployment inflows rise in a recession (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) remain 
potentially relevant. 
In the remainder of this section, however, we want to emphasize that the precise 
economic interpretation of statistical decompositions such as equation (3) is not as clear as it 
might seem.  Up until now, we have followed the literature in interpreting the decompositions as 
answering the question “how much of the increase in unemployment in a recession is due to 
changes in inflows and outflows.”   In what follows, we show that such an interpretation is not 
the only possible reading of decompositions based on (3), and that different models of the labor 
market imply different interpretations. 
We motivate this point with the following metaphor.  Imagine a traffic intersection at 
which a queue of automobiles awaits a green light.  The light stays green long enough in each 
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cycle to allow an outflow of five cars to leave the queue before the light turns red again.  
Ordinarily, only a moderate number of cars is backed up at the light.  But suppose some event – 
say, construction on an alternate route – ramps up the inflow of cars to this intersection.  If 
nothing happens to keep the green light on longer, then the queue gets longer, and each car’s 
wait to get through the intersection becomes longer. 
 Now just for the moment, think of the queue of backed-up cars as unemployment, and 
think of the five cars going through each green light as the outflow from unemployment.  When 
the inflow increased, the stock of unemployment increased, and so did the average duration of 
unemployment.  If an analysis such as ours or Shimer’s were applied here, it would attribute 
much of the increased unemployment to a decreased exit rate even though nothing actually 
changed in the outflow process.  The proximate cause of both the increased unemployment level 
and the increased duration was the increased inflow.22 
 Thus, the traffic metaphor illustrates a possibility worth considering when reacting to 
statistical decompositions of the ins and outs of unemployment.  Although such analyses attempt 
to separate the contributions of inflows and outflows, the inflows and outflows may be inherently 
inseparable.  It could be, for example, that congestion from increased inflows causes outflow 
hazard rates to become lower.23   
 This latter possibility has received little attention in the previous literature on 
unemployment flows, perhaps because of the literature’s focus on search and matching models of 
the aggregate labor market (Pissarides, 1985; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994).  In these models, 
                                                 
22 Note also that, just as the wait until going through the green light would increase for all cars regardless of whether 
they had arrived from the usual route or from the obstructed alternate route, unemployment duration would increase 
for all the unemployed – job losers, job leavers, and labor force entrants – just as found in the analyses by Baker 
(1992), Shimer, and ourselves. 
23 Another example of interaction between inflows and outflows, discussed above in section I.D, is that cyclical 
changes in the composition of the inflow to unemployment (such as the increased share of permanent job losers) 
may cause a reduction in the outflow rate.   
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the number flowing out of unemployment is increasing in the number of unemployed workers, as 
well as in the number of job vacancies.  The matching function that describes this relationship is 
meant to capture frictions that prevent firms and workers from quickly finding (suitable) partners 
for an employment relationship.  Under the typical specification of this matching function, a 
greater number of unemployed workers (the denominator of the outflow hazard) will raise the 
number flowing out of unemployment (the numerator of the outflow hazard) so that the outflow 
rate will not itself depend on the number unemployed.  Put in the language of the traffic 
metaphor, the green light stays on longer when more cars are waiting at the intersection.  
According to these models, then, changes in the outflow hazard will be driven only by 
exogenous variables, notably labor productivity.24  In this theoretical framework, the mechanism 
encapsulated in the traffic metaphor does not arise.   
That particular theoretical perspective, however, is not the only conceivable economic 
interpretation of cyclical flows in the labor market.  Consider, for example, an alternative model 
in which firms face no friction in hiring unemployed workers; that is, firms may hire as many 
unemployed workers as they wish without incurring important search costs.25  Then, given labor 
productivity, firms will choose directly the number of workers to hire out of the unemployment 
pool.  In the language of the traffic metaphor, how long the green light stays on is not determined 
by the number of cars waiting at the intersection.  Then, as in the traffic metaphor, increased 
unemployment due to increased inflows can mechanically reduce outflow hazard rates during 
recessions. 
                                                 
24 Indeed, Shimer (2007, p. 20) makes this point to justify his emphasis on flow hazard rates, rather than the levels of 
the unemployment flows. 
25 Such an assumption may not be an entirely ludicrous approximation, as the average duration of a vacancy is 
consistently less than one month in the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ JOLTS dataset. 
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Viewed through this lens, a more appropriate decomposition of unemployment flows 
might focus on changes in the level of the outflow, since these are independent of the number 
unemployed in the latter model.  It turns out that simple algebraic manipulation of equation (3), 
our framework for decomposing cyclical unemployment variation into inflows and outflows, 
provides such a decomposition: 
(11)  1log log log( )tt tt t
t
ud u d s d f u
u
− ⎡ ⎤≈ −⎣ ⎦

  
This re-expression of equation (3) decomposes cyclical variation in log unemployment into an 
inflow component plus an outflow component involving the log change in the number flowing 
out of unemployment, ttuf ~  (instead of the hazard rate for the outflow, ft).  The monthly version 
of the latter is plotted in figure 12, which reiterates a fact mentioned in this paper’s introduction: 
Even though the hazard rate for exiting unemployment goes down in recessions, the number 
exiting unemployment goes up. 
Given the countercyclicality of the number exiting unemployment, if one viewed 
unemployment flows solely in terms of the model motivating equation (11), one would conclude 
that more than the entirety of the cyclical variation in unemployment is accounted for by 
countercyclical inflows.  That is, one would declare that “The Ins Win” after all.  Our point, 
however, is not to deny the importance of reduced outflow hazard rates in recessions.  Our point 
is that, in order to assess the roles of inflows and outflows in cyclical unemployment, one must 
understand the economic determinants of both the ins and the outs.  The challenge to future 
theoretical work is to develop coherent and plausible models that can account for the full range 
of relevant empirical evidence.  In terms of the particular facts we hope to have clarified in this 
paper, theoretical analyses should explain why job-loss-induced inflows to unemployment 
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increase at the beginning of a recession and why outflows do not increase enough to keep 
unemployment duration from rising.26 
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26 Of course, theoretical work also should endeavor to explain the cyclical features of other salient variables such as 
employment, hours of work, wage rates, vacancies, productivity, capital utilization, etc. 
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Appendix 
 
Discrete-Time Correction for Time Aggregation Bias in Aggregate Inflows 
 
We use an analogous method to Shimer's in discrete time.  That is, we essentially use one 
difference equation, that for the total stock of unemployment: 
 
(A.1) 1/ 4
w w
t t t t tu u s e f tuτ τ τ+ + + + += + − τ  
where stw and ftw are the weekly inflow and outflow probabilities and are assumed constant 
between interview dates, and where 1 1 30, , ,
4 2 4
τ ⎧ ⎫∈⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭  indexes the intervening weeks.  Like 
Shimer, we then make the further assumption that the labor force, tl et t u≡ + , is also constant 
within the interval.  This implies that we can rewrite (A.1) as: 
 
(A.2) ( )1/ 4 1w w wt t t t tu s l s f tuτ τ+ + += + − −  
Solving this equation forward four weeks yields the following non-linear equation: 
 
(A.3)  ( ) ( )3 41
0
1 1
nw w w w w
t t t t t t t
n
u s l s f s f u+
=
= − − + − −∑ t
)
t
Noting that the steady-state weekly unemployment stock in this model is given by 
 yields equation (7) in the main text. (* /w w w wt t t tu s s f= +
 
Discrete-Time Correction for Time Aggregation Bias in Inflows by Reason 
 
 The correction for inflows by reason is a simple extension to the above.  Now there are 
three difference equations to solve out – one for unemployment by each reason: 
 
(A.4) 
, 1/ 4 , , , ,
, 1/ 4 , , , ,
, 1/ 4 , , , ,
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λ τ λ τ λ τ λ λ τ
τ τ τ
τ τ τ
+ + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + + +
= + −
= + −
= + −
τ
τ
 
where i is the stock of non-participation.  We then again assume, like Shimer, that the labor force 
is constant in the month between CPS interviews.  It should be noted that this has the implication 
that the non-participation stock is also constant between months.  Since the unemployment 
system implicit in the above is a closed one (all flows among unemployment, employment, and 
non-participation originate from one of these three categories), the population (the sum of 
unemployment, employment, and non-participation) is implicitly constant.   
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Given this, equation (A.4) is just a non-linear system, which can be solved using 
conventional programs such as MATLAB. 
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Figure 0: Unemployment Rate and Recessionary Unemployment Dates Used 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
19
48
19
50
19
52
19
54
19
56
19
58
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
Recession Dates Unemployment Rate
 
 31
Figure 1: Replication of Shimer’s Figure 1 
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Figure 2: Log Inflow and Outflow Hazard Rates Using Replication of Shimer’s Data 
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Figure 3: Changes in Log Inflow and Outflow Rates by Recession, 1948–2004 
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Figure 4: Month-by-Month Ratio of Short-Term Share of Unemployment in Incoming Rotation 
Groups to Full Sample 
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Figure 5: Effect of Our Alternative Redesign Correction on the 2000-2001 Recession 
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Figure 6: Effects of Different Aggregation Bias Corrections on Measured Log Inflow Rates 
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Figure 7: Effects of Aggregation Bias Corrections on Decomposition 
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Figure 8: Log Inflow Rates by Reason for Unemployment 
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Figure 9: Log Outflow Rates by Reason for Unemployment 
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
Log Job Loser Outflow Rate Log Job Leaver Outflow Rate Log Entrant Outflow Rate
 
 40
Figure 10: Logs of Employment, Non-Participation, and Unemployment as Fractions of the 
Labor Force 
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Figure 11: Decomposition of Increase in Unemployment into Effects of Flows by Reason for Unemployment 
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Figure 12: Level of Monthly Outflow from Unemployment (Quarterly Average) 
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